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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE UNITED STATES air traffic control system is in serious
trouble. With air travel increasing daily, obsolete naviga-
tional equipment from the 1960s, and troublesome government
procurement procedures, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) needs to respond to the important issues facing the U.S.
air traffic control system. One response that could solve, or at
least significantly lessen, these problems is privatization of the
system.
Privatization can produce significant savings for both the gov-
ernment and the consumer while drastically increasing effi-
ciency. Savings of thirty to forty percent over government
performance can be achieved under several privatization
schemes.' At the heart of these privatization plans is competi-
tion. Competition drives the private sector and breeds effi-
ciency. Injecting competition into the air traffic control arena
may be the answer that management of the congested airways
needs.
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The airline industry produces twenty-two million jobs, carries
1.25 billion passengers, and accounts for one trillion dollars per
year in economic production.2 It is estimated that between 1993
1 See Buel White et al., Budget Limitations Spur Privatizations: Continued Federal
Belt-Tightening Will Lead to the Refinement of Existing Outsourcing Techniques and New
Forms of Privatization, NAT'L L.J., May 27, 1996, at B7.
2 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Airlines In Turbulence: Strategies for Survival, 23
TRANSP. L.J. 15, 16 (1995).
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and 2005, U.S. air travel will rise by sixty percent.3 The organiza-
tion responsible for regulating and managing this multi-million
dollar industry is the FAA, which is within the Department of
Transportation.4 The FAA employs approximately 46,000 peo-
ple and has broad regulatory duties including aircraft and air-
port safety, pilot licensing, and maintenance of the air traffic
control system.5
III. HISTORY OF THE FAA
In 1938, Congress created the Civil Aeronautics Authority
(CAA), an agency within the Department of Commerce, to regu-
late air safety. The CAA had authority for aviation safety, inspec-
tion, aircraft certification, and-air traffic control operations. 6
In 1958, the Federal Aviation Agency replaced the CAA.
Then, in 1966, Congress transferred most of its duties to the
Department of Transportation.7 Congress abolished the CAA in
1984, and today the only federal agency responsible for regulat-
ing general aviation is the FAA, formerly known as the Federal
Aviation Agency.8
A 1958 statute delegated great authority and responsibility to
the FAA.9 The statute created agency obligations such as regu-
lating air commerce safety; achieving efficient use of navigable
airspace; implementing plans to control the environmental ef-
fects of civil aviation; and developing and operating a system of
air traffic control, both for commercial and military
navigation. 1o
The FAA establishes air traffic control facilities at specific lo-
cations, determines facility designs and services to be offered,
determines the number of controllers and their function at each
facility, and decides what type of services to provide at each facil-
3 See Frederico Pefia, The Case for an Air Traffic Corporation, ROLL CALL, Mar. 21,
1994, at *2.
4 See Scott A. Hodge, Federal Aviation Administration: Air Traffic Control System, in
HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS 167 (May 1995).
5 See id.
6 See Patrick J. Shea, Solving America's General Aviation Crisis: The Advantages of
Federal Preemption Over Tort Reform, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 747, 751 (1995).
7 See id.; Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931
(1967).
8 See Lyn Loyd Creswell, Airport Policy in the United States: The Need For Accounta-
bility, Planning, and Leadership, 19 TRANsP. L.J. 1, 52 (1990).
9 See Shea, supra note 6, at 751-53.
10 See Creswell, supra note 8, at 52.
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ity." The air traffic control system (ATC) is the largest depart-
ment within the FAA. 2
The FAA's broad powers range from aviation safety to military
defense. Thus, FAA policy is often influenced by competing in-
terests from various facets of government including the Depart-
ment of Transportation, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Justice, the Office of Management and Budget,
and congressional members and committees. 3 These conflict-
ing parties often exert a considerable amount of influence over
FAA actions. The impact of these spheres of influence on the
FAA is discussed later in this Comment. 14
IV. ATC CURRENTLY PART OF THE FAA
The air traffic control system is responsible for directing the
170,000 flight operations that affect more than 1.4 million
Americans each year. 5 Because the ATC is the largest depart-
ment within the FAA, nearly forty-five percent of the FAA's
budget goes to the ATC."6 Furthermore, air traffic control per-
sonnel account for almost 38,000 of the FAA's 53,000 employ-
ees. 7 Of the 38,000 ATC-related employees, three-fourths of
these workers operate the air traffic control system, and the re-
maining one-fourth maintain the equipment.'"
Because the FAA controls ATC, it is subject to federal operat-
ing guidelines. In its efforts to improve and modernize opera-
tions, the ATC has suffered from the "bureaucratic lethargy of
the federal procurement process, civil service rules, and con-
gressional and White House meddling."'" Although these
guidelines were enacted for various noble reasons, they have in-
stead introduced an increasing amount of inefficiency.
I I See Andrew J. Dilk, Aviation Tort Litigation Against the United States-judicial
Inroads on the Pilot-In-Command Concept, 52J. AIR L. & COM. 797, 798 (1987).
12 See Richard A. Charles & Harvey K. Newman, Public Policy and Technology
Management: Changing the Role of Government in the Operation of Air Traffic Control,
TRANSP. J., Sept. 1, 1995, at 39.
13 See Creswell, supra note 8, at 53.
14 See infra part IV.A.4 and accompanying text.
15 See Pefia, supra note 3, at *2.
16 See Amy K. Bock, How to Restore the Airline Industry to its Full Upright Position:
An Analysis of the National Commission to Ensure a Strong, Competitive Airline Industry
Report, 59J. AIR L. & COM. 663, 674 (1994).
17 See Pefia, supra note 3, at *2.
18 See Hodge, supra note 4, at 167.
it Id.
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A. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT ATC SYSTEM-WHY WE
NEED CHANGE
1. Aging Equipment
Historically, it usually takes the air traffic control seven years
from the time an administrator concludes there is a need for a
computer component until it is received.20 During this length
of time, technology becomes obsolete. 2 1 High technology, by its
very nature, is in a continuous state of rapid evolution in almost
all applications. 22 The organization of our democratic govern-
ment with its checks and balances and procedures does not lend
itself to managing an industry that requires high technology in a
constantly changing marketplace.23
Most ATC computer equipment is over twenty years old.24
This age significantly reduces the safety of air traffic and has
contributed to numerous near-airline accidents. Several inci-
dences of power shortages and computer malfunctions have cre-
ated potentially disastrous situations above busy airports.25 For
example, computer malfunctions at Chicago's busiest airports
20 See David Linowes, The Rationale for Privatization: We Must Break Away From
Archaic Concepts: Address at the Executive Officer's Conference of the National Association
of Boards of Pharmacy, Sept. 30, 1995, in VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 86-87 (Nov.
15, 1995).
21 See id.
22 See Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 41.
23 See Thomas G. Donlan, FAA 's Aged Equipment Symbolizes the Failure of Govern-
ment Management, BARRONS, Aug. 28, 1995, at 47.
24 See id.
25 See Glenn Jochum, Change Comes Slowly to Air Traffic Control, Bus. NEWS, July
1, 1996, at *1, available in 1995 WL 8419591. Air traffic controllers complain that
air traffic computers have been malfunctioning for decades, citing this as one of
the reasons for the 1981 strike of ATC workers. See Michael Sangiacomo, Almost
Ready For Takeoff: New Computer at Air Traffic Control Center May Be Operational
Ahead of Schedule; Equipment to be Replaced with Radar by 2001, PIiN DEALER, Jan.
29, 1997, at Bi, available in 1997 WL 6576751. Multiple computer failures in
Chicago's busiest airports raise questions over the reliability of air traffic control
technology. See Gary Washburn, Computer Failure Sends FAA's Aurora Center Scram-
bling: Latest Problem Follows Trouble at Elgin Facility, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23, 1997, at 3.
Aging air traffic control equipment malfunctioned in Long Island, forcing the
controllers to use a manual backup system to handle the incoming flights. Un-
fortunately, these failures have become common in New York and across the
country in recent years as computers age. SeeJuan Forero, Failure of Computer on
Long Island Causes Delays at Newark Airport, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ.), May 21,
1996, at 10. The outdated radar computers have become known for numerous
computer malfunctions during the past three years at Fort Worth's Air Route
Control Center. See G. Chambers Williams III, Radar Fails for 1 Hour, Delaying
Dallas/Ft. Worth Flights, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 18, 1996, at 13.
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have caused controllers' screens to go blank at least eight times
in 1995, leaving the planes in the air without guidance.2" In one
situation, an American Eagle turbo-prop plane avoided a colli-
sion with a private plane only because an onboard collision
avoidance system gave a warning. 27
Each day, technology is rapidly advancing in almost every area
of the transportation industry, which contributes to more effi-
cient systems. 28 Although technological advances have signifi-
cantly contributed to the airline industry,29 air traffic control
technology has not been keeping pace.3 In analyzing these
amazing technological lags, Transportation Secretary Frederico
Pefia said "it's like stepping into a time machine.' Vacuum
tubes and room-sized computers are some of the most visible
indicators of the seriousness of this technological gap.3 2 "There
are air traffic controllers out at Washington National using a
Univac computer that's the size of a house trailer. That huge
Univac packs barely one-tenth the computing power of a three-
pound laptop you can buy in any Radio Shack today. '13 3 These
outdated forms of control not only cause delays but have also
begun to pose serious safety concerns. According to Mark
Scholl of the Air Traffic Controller's Association, computer fail-
ures have become "an extreme safety hazard ... [because] we
are asking controllers to work every day with equipment
designed before they were born." 4 Currently, the FAA remains
the largest buyer of vacuum tubes, purchasing $19 million worth
a year, which are used by thirty-year-old main frame com-
26 See GilbertJimenez, New Air Traffic Computer Due Early: Quicker Fix for Stressed
System, CHI. SUN-TIMES, April 3, 1996, at 1.
27 See Gary Washburn, Air Center Gets Hope In Computer Malfunctions May End at
Aurora Facility, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 1997, at 1.
28 See Hearings Before the House Aviation Subcomm., 104th Cong. 82-89 (1995)
(testimony of Gerald Baliles, former Chairman, National Commission to Ensure
A Strong Competitive Airline Industry) [hereinafter Baliles Testimony] (discussing
technological advances in several areas of transportation such as shipping, rail-
road, automotive, and aviation).
29 See id. In the past several decades, airplanes have been the recipient of sig-
nificant technological advancements, such as the advent of the commercial jet
engine and the applications of computer designs to aviation aircraft. See id.
30 See id.
31 Pefia, supra note 3, at *3.
32 See Baliles Testimony, supra note 28, at 85.
33 Pefia, supra note 3, at *2-*3.
34 John Zollinger, US Air Traffic Control System Hits Heavy Flak from Reform Deba-
cle, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 5, 1996, at *1.
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puters 5 In 1996, equipment failures, overhaul, relocation, and
modifications resulted in over 2.5 million hours of outages. 6
One may think that because there have been technological
lapses, there would be an increase in personnel to pick up the
slack where technological advancements have not. This is not
the case. Unfortunately, working without additional technology,
there are 2000 fewer full-time air traffic controllers today at-
tempting to manage thirty-six percent more traffic than existed
in 1981.1 7 Systems specialists are maintaining 12,000 more facili-
ties than they were in 1981 with 5,600 fewer specialists. 38 To-
day's controllers are feeling the pressures of six-day work weeks,
increased workloads, and intense air traffic.39 The premise of
the lower staffing ratios was that a technological revolution
would occur and that the ATC would be able to manage with
fewer controllers.4 ° This revolution, unfortunately, has not oc-
curred, and air traffic controllers today are forced to manage
and direct today's air traffic with 1960s technology.4'
This outdated equipment has led to significant economic
losses. "Depending on whose numbers you believe, delays
caused by air traffic control cost airlines and passengers from
$300 million to $1.5 billion a year. "42 Although many delays are
weather related, new "state of the art systems could make a sig-
nificant dent in delays due to weather conditions and conges-
tion . . . . [T]hese technologies could increase peak-hour
capacity during poor weather by up to 40 percent at some busy
'5 See Randall Lane, FAA Inc., (Privatization of Federal Aviation Administration),
FORBES, Aug. 26, 1996, at 48.
36 See generally Air Traffic Control and Aviation Oversight: Hearings Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Transportation Appropriations, 105th Cong. 5 (1997) (testimony of
Barry Krasner, President, National Air Traffic Controllers Association) [hereinaf-
ter Krasner Testimony 1].
37 See Financial Assessment of the FAA, Hearings Before the House Aviation Subcomm.,
105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WL 11233150 (testimony of Joe Fruscella)
[hereinafter Fruscella Testimony].
38 See Information & Technology Corporate Structures For Government Functions:
Hearings Before the House Government Reform & Oversight Committee, Subcommittee on
Government Management, 104th Cong. 234-243, 226-233 (1995) (testimony of Barry
Krasner, and Jack Johnson, President, Professional Airways Systems Specialists)
[hereinafter Krasner and Johnson Testimony].
39 See Krasner Testimony I, supra note 36.
40 See Krasner and Johnson Testimony, supra note 38.
41 See id.
42 David Field, Gore Set to Unveil Air Traffic Control Plan, WASH. TIMES, May 3,
1994, at B7 (emphasis added).
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airports. ' 43 Currently, during times of air congestion, "safety is
only maintained.., by spacing out planes and keeping them on
runways.""4  Former Transportation Secretary Jim Burnley
predicts major congestion and horrendous delays for travelers if
reform is not initiated now.45
The ATC system is often perceived as unresponsive with re-
gard to scheduling and routing needs, but it is the lagging tech-
nological implementation that makes this perception a reality.
Since World War II, the methods of separating aircraft and as-
signing routes have virtually remained the same.4" "Without
technological improvements, the reduction of separation crite-
ria in order to more effectively use airspace-long urged by the
aviation community-is an impossibility. Current equipment
limitations prohibit even considering such reductions. 47
In addition to delay increases, by the year 2015, the number
of passenger planes is expected to more than double to 23,000,
thus sharply increasing the potential number of accidents."
"According to some estimates, by 2005 there will be a major air-
plane accident somewhere in the world once every two weeks.
By 2015, there could be a major accident every week."' 9 These
predictions send a startling message. Unless the nation listens
and responds with a plan to efficiently manage the ever-increas-
ing amount of air congestion, the United States will cease to
lead the world in aviation safety. As the technology utilized by
the nation's air traffic controllers continues to become more ob-
solete, and air travel congestion rises, the risks of a foreseeable
disaster rise significantly.
2. Procurement Policies
"Federal procurement policies were originally developed to
ensure fairness and to diminish the likelihood of bias . .. in
federal purchasing or contract awards."5"' These policies, how-
43 Bureaucracy to Boardroom: Crafting Air Traffic Control, Inc., GOVERNING MAG.,
Jan. 1994, at 55.
44 Flying the Tangled Skies, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1995, at A10.
45 See id.
46 See Anthony C. Darienzo, A Discussion of the Proposed Privatization of the Air
Traffic Control System, 9 AIR & SPACE LAw. 9, 11 (1995).
47 Id.
48 See Les Blumenthal, Aircraft Safety in 21st Century "Daunting" Challenge for In-
dusty/Airlines, Manufacturers Gather for Conference Amid Dire Predictions, NEws TRIB-
UNE (Tacoma, WA), Jan. 15, 1997, at B10.
49 Id.
51) Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 41.
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ever, "have become counterproductive by driving costs up and
reducing organizational effectiveness."51 At the heart of the
FAA's failure to use computer technology effectively "is a pro-
curement system that does not procure. 52
President Clinton has cited government procurement restric-
tions and red tape as factors that inhibit the FAA's ability to
modernize." Bidding laws often create delays of up to five years
by requiring written specifications and evaluations of plans, sub-
mission of detailed documents for solicitation, and contract
awards.54 For example, the FAA cannot
accept the first bid on any contract, even if it is clearly the best
price and quality of equipment available in the world. [It] must
solicit bids from a vast universe of potential contractors, and even
then may see the winning bid delayed in an elaborate appeals
process by losers. 5
These procurement procedures have been criticized because
they are "so cumbersome that by the time the FAA finalizes its
contracts, it is often buying out-of-date equipment."5 6 In addi-
tion to slowing technological advancements, federal govern-
ment procedures also "hinder the FAA's ability to hire and
reassign personnel."57 Thus, these costly federal procurement
requirements contribute both to a lagging system of technologi-
cal advancement within the ATC system controls, and also to the
current shortage of qualified air traffic controllers. Although
there have been recent changes with the FAA's procurement
procedures, the effectiveness of the attempted reform remains
to be seen.58
3. Budget Restraints
Currently, the ATC is under the budget control of Congress.
Unfortunately, congressional interference in ATC management
has proven to be another hurdle to efficient operations.59
David Linowes, Senior Policy Advisor to the Institute of Govern-
51 Id.
52 Donlan, supra note 23, at 47.
53 See Clinton Urges Congress to Pass Privatization Legislation, AIR SAFETY WK., May
15, 1995, at 3.
54 See Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 41.
55 Pefia, supra note 3, at *3.
56 Bureaucracy to Boardroom, supra note 43, at 55.
57 Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 41.
58 See infra part V.
59 See id.
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ment Public Affairs, has said that "the problem is with the
agency structure and legislative restrictions. Congress has a
penchant for micro-managing its agencies. ' Congressional re-
straints have resulted in the FAA's inability "to compensate ATC
employees equitablywith respect to high-cost living areas, and to
implementation of technical resources in inappropriate loca-
tions in response to more powerful Congressional leaders exer-
cising budgetary control."' '61 In addition, Congressional funding
is an unpredictable, year-to-year process that makes long-range
planning impossible.6 2
These budget restraints have severely hindered any progress
or technological advancements encouraged by the private mar-
ket. "The FAA and its technologically backward air traffic con-
trol system are constrained by an inflexible bureaucracy and
stifled by rigid civil service and procurement rules. '63 Severe re-
straints and limitations are imposed on the agency's ability to
spend the funds it receives through the federal budget
process.64
Many of the proposed plans that call for removing Congres-
sional control of the ATC from Congress are defeated before
the perspective chambers even vote. Persuading Congress to re-
duce its control is often very difficult.65 As one commentator
noted, such a "plan would remove power from people who are
very good at keeping power."66
There is a significant amount of unpredictability that accom-
panies the federal budgetary process.67 This unpredictability
often hinders long-term planning abilities for all who are con-
trolled by Congress.
High technology, by its nature, is in a continuous state of rapid
evolution in almost all applications. When tied to governmental
bureaucracy it can be severely restrained. As a department
wholly contained within a federal agency, and, perhaps more im-
portantly, as an organization funded by tax revenues, the air traf-
fic control organization is tied directly to the Congressional
budget process. As the goals and priorities of Congress change
6o Linowes, supra note 20, at 86.
61 Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 39.
62 See Baliles Testimony, supra note 28, at 86.
63 Robert W. Poole,Jr. & Viggo Butler, How to Make the Skies Safer, WALL ST. J.,
June 24, 1996, at A14.
64 See Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 41.
65 See Bureaucracy to Boardroom, supra note 43, at 55.
66 Id.
67 See Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 41.
642
REVAMPING AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
with each fiscal year and election period, budgetary planning for
ATC becomes tenuous, at best.6
In addition, it is not surprising that when an ATC area is placed
"under the control of Congress, despite the presumed educa-
tion, sophistication, and good intentions of [members of Con-
gress, there is] an irresistible temptation to meddle with that
area's internal structure, regardless of the knowledge or experi-
ence of particular individuals."69 This Congressional "micro-
management has been broadly cited by government and indus-
try as a major hurdle to efficient conduct of the nation's air traf-
fic control system."7
Although Congress has succeeded in passing some legislation
to expedite the lengthy process of ATC modernization,7 the
budgetary dilemma rages on. Congress recognizes the existence
and the seriousness of the FAA's long-term financing problems
and has created the National Civil Aviation Review Commission
to address concerns and offer financial solutions to the Secre-
tary of Transportation.72 In addition, Congress has directed an
independent assessment of the FAA's financial requirements.75
It is difficult to estimate the severity of the FAA's modernization
funding crises. The FAA has already estimated a $9 billion
shortfall between its existing requirements and funding levels
through 2002."M FAA officials estimate that this $9 billion poten-
tial shortfall could increase by an additional $4 billion if the
agency tries to accelerate the National Airspace System
modernization.75
Notably, the Clinton Administration strongly supports fund-
ing air modernization efforts through user fees.76 The Adminis-
68 Id. at 41.
69 Id. at 42.
70 Id.
71 See infra part VII.
72 See Fiscal Year 98 Transportation Appropriations Economic Development Division:
Testimony Before the House Subcomm. on Transportation, 105th Cong. 490, 515





76 See Air Traffic Control and Aviation Safety Oversight: Hearings Before the Senate
Appropriations Committee, 105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WL 11233676
(statement of Phil Boyer).
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tration has requested $300 million in user fees for fiscal year
1998 and supports a 100% user funded system for 1999. 7 7
4. FAA's Mismanagement
The FAA has been plagued with its share of management dif-
ficulties. Most of these difficulties are related to the excessive
bureaucratic procedures and policies. The FAA culture has
been referred to as "averse to risk ... often [pitting] one inter-
nal organization against an other,... [and inhibiting] the effec-
tive flow of information. '7' Both President Clinton's National
Performance Review and a federal commission studying the air-
line industry concluded that the FAA, as a government agency,
has little incentive to provide air traffic control services
efficiently.79
A former airline commission member, Daniel Kasper, ex-
plained that the "air traffic control system is the equivalent of
the production line for the airline industry."8"' Usually, if there
is an investment, such as new equipment, which will lower a
firm's production costs, then the firm will invest in the new
equipment to increase their production line efficiency."' The
problem is that airlines cannot invest in much needed new
equipment because they do not own the production line; the
FAA does. 2
An example of the internal mismanagement is the FAA's plan
to modernize air traffic control. This plan, known as the Ad-
vanced Automation System (AAS), has been the victim of poor
predictive planning, the cost has risen from $2.5 billion to $7.6
billion, and the estimated time of completion has been moved
from 1994 to 2002. Critics say that "[t]he FAA is a mess. In the
1990s, its top improvement projects have, on average, run five
years behind schedule and 52% above budget. Its effort to re-
place automated ATC facilities has burned through $7.6 billion
since 1983 and is still eight years behind schedule." 3
77 See id.
78 GERALD DILLINGHAM, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AVbx-
TION RESEARCH: PERSPECTIVES OF FAA's EFFORTS TO DEVELOP NEW TECHNOLOGY 8
(1995).




83 Lane, supra note 35, at 48.
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The time for change has arrived. The ATC has fallen signifi-
cantly behind technologically, and the current federal bureau-
cratic restraints are only harming the American public. It is not
that the FAA and the ATC are not trying to improve, but given
the nature of the federal governmental guidelines, budget re-
straints, and procurement procedures, the ATC has not been
afforded the opportunity to keep pace. Gerald Baliles, former
chairman of the National Commission to Ensure a Strong Com-
petitive Airline Industry, has stated that "unless we make major
changes, we will be putting not only the efficiency but the safety
of the air transportation system at risk. Some argue that we put
those things at risk by acting. I believe the risk of inaction is
much greater, and far more certain.
8 4
"In America, too many government agencies are trying to
solve today's social and fiscal problems with outmoded struc-
tural designs and solutions. We must break away from archaic
concepts and apply constructive alternatives ...... "- In 1991, a
National Academy of Sciences panel found that the shortcom-
ings of the FAA are a result of managerial problems inherent
within any government agency.s6 Over the years, commentators
have identified numerous problems contributing to the mod-
ernization crises. These causes include technical difficulties,
management problems, and the lack of stability and continuity
in the FAA's top management." Since 1987, there have been
seven FAA Administrators, averaging one every sixteen
months.88
But there is good news. Modern communication technology
that can revolutionize our skies exists, adding hundreds of new
services and products that can be maintained and managed by
the private sector.89 "The bad news is that the FAA is standing in
the way" of the badly needed changes. 90 "Beset by equipment
failures, inefficiencies, featherbedding, and an insatiable fiscal
appetite, America's air traffic system overcontrols, overregulates,
and overtaxes its customers."'" Although the ATC system is still
84 Baliles Testimony, supra note 28, at 85.
85 Linowes, supra note 20, at 86.
86 See Flying the Tangled Skies, supra note 44, at A10.
87 See Anderson Statement, supra note 72, at 490.
88 See Lane, supra note 35, at 48.
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safe, criticism is mounting as Washington debates, ATC equip-
ment ages, and the system grows increasingly inefficient.12
It is ironic that the purpose behind government control was
to give people better goods and services at lower prices. 3 The
idea was that without the cost of profits, competition, and adver-
tising, "government could outperform the private sector. 94
This has not been the case, and as a matter of fact, the exact
opposite has resulted. Because competitive stimuli and com-
mercial pressures are absent, government-owned facilities have
been less effective as well as more expensive.9 Two of the most
prevalent solutions offered to solve these problems are privatiza-
tion and corporatization.
V. SOLUTIONS: PRIVATIZATION v. CORPORATIZATION
A. PRIVATIZATION IN GENERAL
Privatization refers to "the transfer of government assets [or]
operations to private business interests. ' Usually, privatization
is a reaction to government control that has "become entangled
in its own power, stifling creativity and productivity."97 Too
often, government agencies responsible for serving people are
unable to deliver effective services. The result is inefficiency.
Privatization is often seen as an effective alternative to the out-
moded structural designs and solutions frequently implemented
to combat the continual problems facing government agencies.
It is important to note, however, that although privatization calls
for removing governmental control and creating a corporation,
the government must always be responsible for making policy
and monitoring standards for anything that affects the public
welfare.98 Although operations of those functions may be
turned over to the private sector, governmental safety regulation
is imperative.
Reasons for the governmental breakdown stem from the fact
that a government agency does not have to keep abreast of the
latest technology, to find the latest cost saving developments, or
to innovate. The pressures existing on the private sector are not
112 See E. Thomas McClanahan, Tape and Baling Wire, KANSAS CITY STAR, Feb. 4,
1996, at J2.
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present within the government, nor are there funds within the
government with which to experiment and conduct research.
Compared to government supply systems, privatization
schemes offer superior means of delivering services such as air
traffic control because there are greater incentives that exist
within the private sector, resulting in lower costs and innovative
production. 9 "Privatization's biggest strength is that it in-
troduces competition into government services . . . [which]
forces firms to work harder . . .mean[ing] that the quality of
service goes up." 10 ° A privatization plan would remove the ATC
from government control, thus adding competition and remov-
ing the bureaucratic red tape that keeps government agency
modernization moving at such a slow pace.
There are primarily three forms of privatization: contracting
out, divestiture, and corporatization. Contracting-out is the
most frequently undertaken form of privatization. This refers to
the government contracting out specific support functions to
private companies to obtain services that may increase effi-
ciency. Divestiture (full privatization) refers to complete priva-
tization of government operations or assets to private
ownership. Usually, this takes the form of selling off an organi-
zation or function of the government, 0 1 as our Canadian coun-
terparts have done.
B. CORPORATIZATION IN GENERAL
Corporatization, a more modest version of privatization, re-
fers to transferring government operations to serve primarily
commercial public functions. 10 2 Corporatization does not call
for a complete government withdrawal. Instead, corporatization
of the ATC calls for restructuring the air traffic control as a gov-
ernment corporation. This arrangement would allow the gov-
ernment to retain control and ownership of the ATC, but would
remove the budget restraints that the system currently exper-
See Ronald J. Daniels & Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Provision of Public Infra-
structure: An Organizational Analysis of the Next Privatization Frontier, 46 U. To-
RONTO L.J. 375 (1996).
100 Charles Oliver, National Issue A Way to Really Shrink Government, INVESTOR'S
Bus. DAILY, Oct. 11, 1996, at Al.
101 See White et al., supra note 1, at B7.
102 See id.
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iences. 10 3 Corporate principles of finance and procurement
would replace government procedures. 1
4
In 1993, the Clinton Administration established the National
Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry.
The commission was given ninety days to produce a report to
the President and Congress."' 5 The Commission made several
recommendations, which all centered on four themes: "effi-
ciency, technological superiority, financial strength, and access
to global markets."" 6 The commission finally concluded that
creating a government corporation was the most feasible
solution.
The Commission further concluded that this federal corpo-
rate entity operate according to several principles:
1. The corporation should have the ability to create and use a
predictable, stable source of revenue for operations, mainte-
nance and capital investment;
2. The corporate entity should have the ability to issue long
term bonds for capital purchases;
3. Expenditures and revenues should be removed from the fed-
eral budget in equal amounts for a fiscally neutral effect;
4. The corporate entity should have the flexibility to attract and
retain high-caliber leadership and staff;
5. The corporate entity should have the flexibility to create sys-
tems for procurement, staffing, and budgeting consistent
with the best practices in the private sector;
6. There should be flexibility in an orderly transfer of operating
functions to the corporate entity; and
7. Air traffic control services to the Defense Department should
be continued in order to meet national security require-
ments and retain flexibility to attract and retain high-caliber
leadership and staff.' °7
103 See ATC Privatization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Appropriations of the
House Comm. on Transportation, Appropriations Subcomm., 103d Cong. 235-243
(1995) (testimony of Barry Krasner, President of National Air Traffic Controllers
Association) [hereinafter Krasner Testimony II].
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C. FULL PRIVATIZATION OR CORPORATIZATION AS A SOLUTION
TO ATC PROBLEMS
1. History
Air traffic control is an area in which there has been growing
concern with the government's ability to effectively and effi-
ciently maintain a safe, effective navigation system. Privatization
was first put forth by Glen A. Gilbert, an aviation consultant, in
1975.108 He proposed a plan separating the ATC from the FAA,
which was to be funded by user fees and tax revenues.10 9 In
1982, Robert Poole proposed a plan based on a nonprofit, user-
funded, user-owned corporation.' In 1985, the Air Transport
Association (ATA), a nonprofit organization representing air-
line interests, proposed a plan for an ATC organization which
would be completely user-funded."'
Finally, in 1989, the federal government commissioned the
Transportation Research Board (TRB) of the National Research
Council to investigate and report on the operation of the airline
industry since the beginning of deregulation in 1978. In 1991,
the board published its report entitled Winds of Change: Domestic
Air Transport Since Deregulation."2 The report stated that "the
FAA had fallen steadily behind the airlines it was serving and
regulating, and had lost much of its ability to keep pace with the
needs of the industry." 1 3 The focus of the report was on the air
traffic control system's inability to technologically keep pace
with the air traffic growth. The ATC was cited as being responsi-
ble for traffic delays, a condition sure to get worse as air travel
increased." 4
"In 1992, the Aviation Consumer Action Project focused on
the effect of the ATC problem most visible to the public-opera-
tional delays.""' 5 The project issued a report calling for the ATC
to be spun off from the FAA. In 1993, yet another group-the
Infrastructure Subcouncil of the Competitiveness Policy Coun-
cil-concluded that the FAA needed fundamental change.









115 Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 40.
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Eventually, on May 3, 1994,116 the Executive Oversight Com-
mittee (EOC) produced a two-hundred-page report advocating
and detailing the creation of the United States Air Traffic Serv-
ices Corporation (USATS). l 7 This report mirrored the earlier
findings of the TRB's 1991 Winds of Change analysis emphasiz-
ing findings of the ATC's inability to keep pace with the deregu-
lated airline industry.118 The USATS report set forth a plan for
solving the ATC crisis through a solution known as
"corporatization."
It is important to point out the distinction between plans call-
ing for full privatization and those that take a more modest
privatization approach, often set up as plans of corporatization.
Many commentators use these terms almost synonymously with
one another. Nevertheless, plans calling for true privatization
call for complete government withdrawal from air traffic con-
trol. The ATC would be completely turned over to the private
aviation industry. But full scale privatization proposals are often
criticized for creating organizations that will make safety a bot-
tom-line pressure." 9 Thus, full scale privatization is a much less
popular approach than corporatization.
2. Organization of a Corporatization Proposition
The USATS plan calls for privatization of the air traffic con-
trol system by creating a wholly owned not-for-profit govern-
ment corporation to operate and maintain the system. The
FAA's role in maintaining safety and security would remain un-
changed. The government corporation's responsibilities would
include operation and maintenance of the ATC system, purchas-
ing navigational equipment, hiring, firing, and reassignments of
those employees free of civil service regulations.120
The operation of USATS would be goverened by an eleven-
member board of directors. The positions on this board will
include a CEO, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of
Defense, four commercial airline seats, and several government
and union seats. Board decisions would be based on the major-
ity-rule principle. 21 The FAA would retain regulatory control
116 See Darienzo, supra note 46, at 9.
117 See Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 40.
118 See id.
119 See William Jackson, Unions Balk at Privatizing FAA System Modernization,
GoV'T COMPUTER NEWS, June 19, 1995, at 87.
120 See Darienzo, supra note 46, at 10.
121 See Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 45.
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over USATS, but Congress would lose control of the ATC's
budget.122 Congress dislikes this proposal because it objects to
the loss of authority over the largest portion of FAA and con-
tends that it should have a role in the system affecting the facili-
ties and costs of the traveling consumer. 123
The USATS plan essentially focuses on removal of the ATC
from the Congressional budgetary process and relief from the
restrictions of government procurement regulations and per-
sonnel laws. Acquisition guidelines would replace regulations
for procurement and the no-strike provision would be re-
tained. 124 In addition, this privatization plan would eliminate
the currently inefficient procurement system of waste. 125
3. Privatization Deficit Reduction Benefits
Privatizing the ATC, whether through full privatization or
corporatization, could contribute to repairing the deficit by giv-
ing the government one outlet to raise revenue without a tax
increase and without cutting the quality of services provided.
Experts say that the sale of federal assets could raise significant
sums of money126 and the sale of the ATC could be a part of that
savings plan. An estimated $3.5 billion can be raised for the
United States government by selling the ATC to its users. 1 27
Those disillusioned with reform attempts, which have raged on
for more than a decade and accomplished very little, recognize
the utility of privatization and say that it is unfortunate that out-
right privatization of the ATC has received so little
consideration.128
4. Concerns About Plans of Privatization
a. Safety
Currently, the U.S. is proud to have the safest and most efficient
air traffic control system in the world today. However, the cracks
in the system are now starting to show, and if this nation intends
122 See Robert W. Moorman, Air Traffic Control: U.S. Restructuring, AIR TRANS-
PORT WORLD, July 1994, at 53.
123 See Avery Vise, ATC's Future Hostage to Turf Sensitive Congress, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., May 16, 1994, at 39.
124 See Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 45.
125 See id.
126 See Oliver, supra note 100, at Al.
127 See id.
128 See McClanahan, supra note 92, at J2.
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to maintain its leadership status in the aviation arena, meaning-
ful reform of the FAA is a must.1 2
9
America has relied primarily on the private sector to create
aircraft technology that leads the world, cost-effective airlines
that span the globe, corporate and general aviation that sup-
ports the world's most competitive economy, and an aviation in-
frastructure that keeps mankind's most complex machines in
the air, day in and day out. This private initiative and creativity
is now ready to help repair our aviation system's weakest link, an
outdated air traffic control structure. 13 )
Safety is the primary concern for those who believe that effec-
tiveness will be impaired as FAA officials cross from the FAA gov-
ernment bureaucracy to the ATC corporate organization. 1 '
The fear centers around the risk of cost control pressures lead-
ing to a reduction in safety standards. In arguing for corpora-
tization rather than a full privatization scheme, the union
representing air traffic controllers believes that air traffic con-
trol and aviation safety are inherent government functions, and
contend that continued government ownership is a necessity.3
In his address before the House of Representatives, Barry Kras-
ner, President of the National Air Traffic Controllers Associa-
tion (NATCA), stated that the controllers
fully understand the budget pressures that seem to be driving the
concept of a private air traffic control corporation. However,
prior to considering this drastic leap, two questions must be an-
swered. Can a fully private ATC system provide better and/or
safer services? Are the budget savings worth the risk? Both
NATCA and PASS (Professional Airways Systems Specialists) be-
lieve that the answer to both of these pivotal questions is a re-
sounding NO.'3 '
Although NATCA and PASS do not support full scale privatiza-
tion because of fear that a private company, whether for-profit
or not-for-profit, will make safety answerable to the bottom line,
they are both on record as supporting the Clinton Administra-
tion's plan to corporatize the ATC.' 34
129 Krasner Testimony I, supra note 36, at 5.
11%) See Coyne, supra note 89, at A14.
31 See David Collogan, General Aviation Groups Skeptical of Corporate Control, Av.
WK. & SPACE TECII., May 16, 1994, at 39.
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There are several different versions of privatization plans, and
many areas of the aviation industry disagree over which ap-
proach is the best approach to take to solving a universally rec-
ognized inefficient system of control. Of these various plans
utilizing varying degrees of privatization, one thing that the en-
tire aviation community agrees on is that full scale for-profit
privatization is not the answer.1 , 5 A government corporation,
on the other hand, would allow the government to retain con-
trol over safety yet free the ATC from the cumbersome federal
rules of procurement and personnel activities. 1 6
One privatization scheme proposed by the Reason Founda-
tion centers around the principle of "user pay means user
say." '37 Robert Poole, founder of the Reason Foundation and
co-author of the proposal emphasized that "[t]he only way to
solve the underlying problems of our dysfunctional air traffic
control organization is to change its corporate culture by taking
ATC outside of government and turning funding and control
over to aviation users."1 38 This plan calls for implementing a
fee- structure developed by the board of a user-controlled, not-
for-profit ATC corporation modeled after the Canadian com-
pany, Nav Canada, which recently took over ATC in Canada. 39
The plan's safety depends on a user-driven corporate system.
Poole stated that "[s] afety is inherently a function of technology.
A commercial corporate culture would put in place and keep in
place state-of-the-art technology that meets the needs of users,
rather than wasting years and billions on systems that do not
work."1 40
One thing this system does value, as do all of the various pro-
posed privatization and corporatization plans, is the need for
continued FAA involvement in safety regulation. The various
plans differ as to the amount of involvement the government
should have in funding and control of the system, but virtually
every plan recognizes the need for some amount of safety super-
vision by a governmental agency such as the FAA.
135 See id.
136 See NATCA Faults Privatization, Still Backs Government Corporation, Av. DAILY,
Feb. 17, 1995, at 270.
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b. Political Factors
Despite the apparent overall benefits of corporatization, the
airline industry itself remains skeptical. Much of this hesitancy
stems from how the Clinton Administration's plan organizes the
board of directors. There is much concern pertaining to bal-
anced and proportional representation on the board. The Ad-
ministration's plan (USATS) calls for "a government-owned
corporation, supported by user fees and governed by a board of
directors that represents the system's customers."'' Representa-
tives of smaller users expect it to be biased in favor of large air
carriers. Although the current plan calls for four of the at-large
board seats to be filled by members of the airline community,
the airline industry is withholding endorsement of USATS until
more details can be obtained.
Likewise, airline pilots are noncommittal about the ATC cor-
poration. Airline Pilots Association President, Randolph Bab-
bitt, said pilots "believe that analyzing the problem and finding
solutions should precede a decision on a governmental corpora-
tion or a privatized ATC system."' 14 2
c. Right to Strike
Those opposed to plans of privatization are very concerned
about the legal rights that private employees have to strike. In
any private corporation arena, the employees have the right to
strike. National Air Traffic Controllers President, Barry Krasner,
said that in a government corporation, workers "would forgo the
right to strike in exchange for binding arbitration; but in a pri-
vate corporation, workers would not accept that exchange.' 1 43
A semi-government controlled ATC corporation proposal
would continue to prohibit controllers from striking. 144
Although the wisdom of outlawing strikes by government work-
ers is debatable, such a ban exists and would continue to exist
under any privatization plan.'45 The policy behind this ban sup-
ports the notion that the ATC is a vital part of the American
14, Bock, supra note 16, at 677 (quoting Gore Backs ATC Reform, Essential Air
Service Cutbacks, Av. DAILY, Sept. 8, 1993, at 375.).
142 NATCA Faults Privatization, supra note 136, at 270.
143 Id.
144 See Randolph E. Schmid, Air Traffic Control Corporation Urged, TuiE AsSOCt-
ATED PRESS, Dec. 20, 1994, available in 1994 WL 10113554.
145 See Clinton's Union Homage, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, May 12, 1993, at B8.
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Canada is the first country to achieve a completely privatized
air traffic control system. On November 1, 1996, the Canadian
government sold the nation's air traffic control system for $1.5
billion Canadian ($1.12 billion U.S.). 14 6 The government trans-
ferred all air navigation operations, equipment, and 6,400 em-
ployees to a new company called Nav Canada.147 In addition to
the purchase price of $1.5 billion, Nav Canada was forced to
obtain an additional $1.5 billion in financing as reserve funds to
support continuing operations. 4 s
Nav Canada is a nonprofit organization made up of Canada's
major airlines, private aircraft owners, the pilots' union, and the
air traffic employees. Nav Canada has a "legislated monopoly
over air traffic control . . . [with] . . . the right to set fees for
planes that fly through Canadian air space."' 49 The company
will rely completely on user fees to meet operating costs and
profits will be used to modernize the system. The company has
been carefully structured with a board that has representation
from all aviation interest groups in order to avoid domination by
any one.150
The corporation is accountable to a fifteen-member board of
directors. "Ten [of these] members are appointed by a cross-
section of stakeholders-four by commercial air carriers, three
by the Canadian government, two by unions representing Nav
Canada's employees and one by business aircraft owners." 15 1
Those ten board members select four more board members who
cannot be stakeholders, and those fourteen then appoint the
146 See John Urquhart, Canada Privatizes Air Traffic Control, Lifting U.S. Effort,
WALL ST. J., Nov.1, 1996, at B5.
147 See Ed Carson, 0' Canada! Privatizing Air Traffic Control, REASON, Apr. 1,
1996, at 23.
148 See Canadian Air Traffic Control System Plans IPO, CNS OUTLOOK, Dec. 11,
1996, available in 1996 WL 8539782.
149 Dan Westell, A Monopoly Takes Off: On Nov. 1, A New Company Called Nay
Canada Will Control the Nation's Skies. But Who's Going to Control It?, FIN. POST, Oct.
5, 1996, at 14.
150 See Poole & Butler, supra note 63, at A14.
15' Bruce D. Nordwall, Canada's ATC First to Go Fully Private, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 4, 1996, at 25.
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president and chief executive officer, who becomes the fifteenth
board member.
Critics say that the structure raises serious questions of ac-
countability because there is little external market discipline,
leaving the board only constrained by its members. Although
the Nav Canada board does represent a cross section of the avia-
tion industry, critics fear that this structure will ultimately result
in a closed system. 152
This privatization scheme moves Canada beyond other coun-
tries that have commercialized their ATC systems by running
them as government-owned corporations. Nav Canada is com-
pletely "operated and financed by its business users."' 5' Fees
will be imposed on those aircrafts that use the air traffic control
system rather than the now outdated method of generating reve-
nue through an airline ticket tax. The eight percent transporta-
tion tax consumers used to pay on air tickets will be phased-out
within the next two years and commercial airlines and business
aircraft owners will pay user fees to cover the cost of operating
the ATC. ' 54
Nav Canada has been strategically structured as a not-for-
profit corporation. This "zero-profit basis"' 55 will contribute to
the continued safety of air traffic control by removing any moti-
vation to maximize profits by cutting safety features. "Sheltered
from the need to give shareholders a competitive return on in-
vestments, the theory is that Nav Canada will be able to apply
what would have been profit to reduce user fees and operating
costs and upgrade the air navigation system.' 5 1 Consumer
groups warn, however, that commercial airlines will pass on the
cost of user fees to passengers through an increase in ticket
prices.'57 Response to this criticism by Nav Canada Chairman
John Crichton is that airline ticket prices are not likely to go up
because the fees should not exceed the previously assessed eight
percent ticket tax.1 58 No one really knows for sure what will hap-
pen to Canadian ticket prices until the system has been fully
implemented and evaluated.
2 See Westell, supra note 149, at 14.
153 Elizabeth Aird, Air-Traffic Control Now in Private Hands, MONREAL. GAZEIFrE,
Nov. 2, 1996, at D4.
154 See id.
155 Nordwall, supra note 151, at 25-26.
156 Id
157 See Aird, supra note 153, at D4.
158 See id.
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The 6,400 transferred federal employees will maintain the
same pay, benefits, working conditions, and seniority as under
the government system.' 59 These employees include 2,300 air
traffic controllers, 950 flight service specialists, 950 electronic
technicians, and other staffers. 60 The expected results of this
Canadian ATC venture are diminished costs, improved perform-
ance for the airlines, and lower ticket prices for passengers, with-
out a compromise in safety. 16 1
Because Nav Canada now owns Canadian air traffic control,
the corporation's primary responsibilities are operating Can-
ada's "Civil Air Navigation System (ANS), which includes the air
traffic control (ATC) and flight information systems, electronic
navigation/landing aids, providing aviation weather data, and
publishing aviation information.' ' 62 According to the President
of Nav Canada, Kenneth B. Copeland, "[t]his puts Nav Canada
in control of the world's first fully privatized air navigation sys-
tem in the world.' 63 Nav Canada is responsible for the safe and
efficient movement of aircraft, but all regulatory functions, in-
cluding establishing and monitoring safety rules, will remain
with the Canadian government. In addition, Nav Canada takes
on the obligation of researching and developing new technolog-
ical advances to modernize the ATC system.' 64
Nav Canada has not wasted any time implementing moderni-
zation plans. Less than two weeks after purchasing the ATC
from the Canadian government, Hughes Aircraft of Canada won
a $486 million contract from Nav Canada to implement an ad-
vanced air traffic management system known as CAATS (Cana-
dian Automated Air Traffic System). 65 This management
system will automate flight data processing between all major
ATC facilities nationwide. It will also replace aging equipment
with advanced communications software and computing equip-
ment that will make it possible to control planes without the use
of radar. 66
159 See Canada Signs Agreement to Privatize Air Navigation Services, IAC NEWSLET-
TER DATABASE, Jan. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7058893.
16 See Canadian Air Traffic Control System Plans IPO, supra note 148.
161 See Craig Turner, Canada Plans to Privatize Air Traffic Control, WASH. POST,
May 4, 1996, at A21.
162 Nordwall, sup-a note 151, at 25.
163 Id.
164 See id.
165 See Hughes Aircraft Grabs Canadian ATC Deal, CNS OUTLOOK, Nov. 13, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 8539769.
166 See id.
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Morale among the air traffic personnel appears to be high.
Dave Lewis, president of the Canadian Air Traffic Control Asso-
ciation, said that the 2,200 air traffic controllers are happy about
the change-a change that they have lobbied for since 1991.
Lewis emphasized that safety was the primary reason for the con-
trollers advocating this drastic shift to commercial ownership.167
He indicated that with the government remaining the regulator
and legislator, and with the corporation (Nav Canada) as a non-
profit organization, Canada will continue to have the safest air
traffic control system in the world. 6
Along with the operational control change of the ATC comes
liability. Because of this shift, Nav Canada has arranged for ex-
tensive insurance coverage. This coverage has been procured
from a London-based insurer.
Nav Canada attacked its $3 million financing debt by plan-
ning public offerings. The offering was led by the Royal Bank of
Canada, which "agreed to arrange $3 billion in financing from a
syndicate of Canadian and international banks through three
credit facilities."' 6 9 The bond issue has exceeded expectations
according to John Morris, Nav Canada's Director of Communi-
cations. 17° By December 16, 1996, less than seven weeks after
Nav Canada's purchase, the initial public offerings of revenue
bonds were completed and fully subscribed to.'71 Morris says
that investors are confident in the stability and future of Nav
Canada.17
2
So far, Canadian privatization appears to be operating
smoothly. The privatization of the federal air traffic control sys-
tem has been the key to a $2.4 billion improvement in deficit
reduction. The sale to Nav Canada alone is being praised for
adding $1.5 billion to federal budgetary revenues. 7 '
In addition to this praise, the transition has also been hailed a
success with regard to job security. Because Nav Canada offered
jobs to everyone and ninety-nine percent accepted, and because
there will be virtually no change in working conditions, the
167 See id.
168 See Aird, supra note 153, at D4.
I- Canadian Air Traffic Control System Plans IPO, supra note 148.
170 See id.
171 See Air Traffic System Borrows $750 Million, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Dec. 17,
1996, at D4.
172 See Canadian Air Traffic Control System Plans 1PO, supra note 148.
I 7 See Sale of Nay Canada Helps Government Trim October Deficit, OTTAWA CITIZEN,
Dec. 24, 1996, at C6.
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privatization scheme won an award from ReDo, the federal
agency responsible for helping the capital region digest more
than 15,000 job cuts. Not only did Nay Canada not cut jobs, it
also resisted efforts to move the headquarters out of Ottawa, sav-
ing 850 jobs.174
With privatization schemes, the biggest winners appear to be
consumers, who usually enjoy lower prices and improved serv-
ices. Privatization allows more competition by removing the reg-
ulations and allowing the market to direct business. Removing
government management will allow the ATC to have more flexi-
bility and the ability to speedily implement new technological
and other improvements. 17 5
Despite the numerous advantages to ATC privatization, there
is a compromise: lessened privacy rights. Federal Privacy Com-
missioner Bruce Phillips said that "thousands of Canadians lose
their rights under the Privacy Act when such agencies as the air
traffic control system are transferred to the private sector.' 1 76
Documents that are kept secret under federal laws, such as
union grievances, harassment records, and medical reports, will
not be entitled to similar protections under the private domain.
Nav Canada has offered to keep the records confidential, but to
Phillips those assurances are just "words of comfort that are not
legally enforceable. ' 77 Nav Canada has not been forced to com-
ply with privacy laws because of concerns that doing so would
unfairly single it out. There is hope, however, for privacy pro-
tection advancement for the private sector.
Overall, despite privacy concerns, Nav Canada has proved to
be very successful, and United States airline executives support-
ing privatization point to Nav Canada's success to suggest that
the United States use the Canadian system as a model.' 78 The
Canadian system has significantly reduced the federal deficit, re-
placed aging equipment, and lowered prices for consumers. If
174 See Gord McIntosh, Air Traffic Control Set to Fly in New Direction: Non-Profit
Venture Among Business, Government, and Unions Starts Today, OTTAWA CITIZEN,
Nov. 1, 1996, at D13.
175 See Mark Evens, Privatization and Deregulation Have Become Common Themes in
the Transportation Sector; They Have Caused Significant Changes, Forcing Players Into
New Territory to Retain Market Share, FIN. POST, June 1, 1996, at 34.
176 Brad Evenson, Government Privatization Means Loss of Privacy, MONTREAL GA-
ZErrE, July 30, 1996, at A8.
177 Id.
178 See Airline Chiefs Push For ATC, FAA Funding Changes, Av. DAILY, Jan. 14,
1997, at 74.
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the United States were to mimic that system, it is very possible
U.S. ATC would reap the same benefits.
B. GERMANY
Germany has turned its air traffic control system into a gov-
ernment corporation.' The new German ATC was established
in 1993 and is operating on a nonprofit basis, but it is not legally
prohibited from making profits." This new corporation cut
German air traffic delays by twenty-five percent in its first year
alone.'' Funding is from user fees and ninety percent of the
ATC's income is generated by fees for enroute flight operations
within Germany and internal landing fees. 18 2
C. NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand has met with unusual success in becoming the
world's first fully commercial air traffic control organization.' 3
Its ATC firm has produced remarkable results, and has turned
deficits into profits that have continued to grow year after year.
Before becoming a corporation called Airways Corporation of
New Zealand, 18 4 the New Zealand government controlled the
ATC system and posted operating losses of more than $40
million.185
In the five years after privatization, the New Zealand ATC con-
tributed more than $57 million to the government in dividends
and taxes.'" Total annual operating costs decreased from $70.5
million to $47 million.187 These encouraging results are due to
payroll reductions (1,055 employees to 656 employees) and be-
cause the cost per trainee has been reduced twenty-seven per-
cent.8 The system is a government-backed for-profit
corporation that does not draw on taxes but is funded only by
user fees.'8 9 After only six months of operation, New Zealand
ATC reported a $3 million after-tax profit. New Zealand has re-
179 See Carson, supra note 147, at 23.
180 See Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 39.
I'l See Poole & Butler, supra note 63, at A14.
182 See Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 39.
183 See id.
184 See Field, supra note 42, at B7.
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placed its outdated air traffic management system with comput-
erized state-of-art technology. In its ten years of operation,
Airways Corporation has reduced the cost of air traffic control
by more than a third. 9 °
Because of its success in New Zealand, Airways Consulting, a
subsidiary of Airways Corporation of New Zealand, is involved in
the bidding for the privatization program of Malaysia's air traffic
control services, which is currently being managed by the De-
partment of Civil Aviation. Last year, Airways Consulting intro-
duced communications, navigation and surveillance/air traffic
management in New Zealand, and is anxious to implement simi-
lar plans in Malaysia to reduce the congestion due to air traffic
control infrastructure constraints.191
D. SOUTH AFICA
In 1992, the South African government transferred ownership
of ATC to a commercial corporation that remains one hundred
percent government owned. Funding is entirely generated
through user fees, and responsibility for oversight and enforce-
ment of safety matters remains with the government. 192
E. UNITED KINGDOM
One of the world's largest international carriers, British Air-
ways, which serves seventy-two nations and has a total of 155 dif-
ferent destinations, was fully privatized in 1987.93 Serving and
transporting twenty-eight million passengers annually, British
Airways is the leading carrier in the U.S.-U.K. market, flying
nearly forty percent of the seats. Earning a profit every year for
the past ten years has been partly attributed to greater flexibility
as a privatized company. 194
Although Britain's largest air carrier is fully privatized, plans
to privatize the British air traffic control continue to flounder.
Recently, the U.K.'s Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) proceeded
with the privatization of the country's air traffic control system,
known as National Air Traffic Systems (NATS), 95 through mak-
190 See Poole & Butler, supra note 63, at A14.
19' See NZ Firm, Local Partner Bid for Privatization Project Note: International Airport
Technology & Ground Support Exhibition Malaysia, Bus. TIMES, July 27, 1996, at 3.
192 See Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 39.
193 See Dempsey, supra note 2, at 74.
194 See id.
195 See Plan To Drop U.K. Air Traffic Control Privatization Confirmed, JAC NEWSLET-
TER DXIABASE, Oct. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, Market Library, IACNWS File.
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ing the NATS a separate publicly owned subsidiary of the
CAA. 96 The CAA is accepting bids from private companies to
build two new ATC centers at Prestwick, Scotland."'
This private finance initiative is the U.K's first "attempt to en-
courage private companies to undertake public sector capital ex-
penditure for aviation."1 98 The U.K.'s goal for air traffic control
is to implement a system that uses two air traffic control centers
in case one of the centers is not available for service.
Under the new financing scheme, private companies will sup-
ply funds to design and build the equipment to be used at both
new ATC facilities in Scotland. This new plan will make NATS, a
formerly civil-military operation, strictly civil. The Ministry of
Defense will pay £40 million per year for allowing military con-
trollers to use NATS equipment to manage military air traffic.' 99
Although the new scheme appears well-planned, there are
those who strongly oppose the transition. Derek McLauchlan,
chief executive of NATS, said that the scheme was "ill-suited to
the complex nature of the ATC. '2 1 1 McLauchlan's primary con-
cerns are based on the complex nature and safety issues revolv-
ing around ATC systems. He would prefer a plan that would
give NATS more control in figuring the detailed specifications
of a bid instead of allowing investors to develop plans to meet
general requirements. 20 1
Under government controlled methods of contracting work
out to the private sector, detailed specifications are provided by
the government for those private companies interested in bid-
ding on the job. But with the private sector controlling the con-
tract negotiations, comprehensive specifications are left to each
private party interested in bidding. Proponents of privatization
say that this is a positive factor because it stimulates competitive
creativity and competition for ideas among the private bidders.
"Implicit in this view is the notion that governments should shift
their focus from specifying inputs to specifying some desired
outcome, leaving the private sector providers with the opportu-
nity of formulating means of realizing that outcome in the most
196 SeeJohn D. Morrocco, U.K. Restructures Air Traffic Control, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Apr. 8, 1996, at 32.
197 See U.K. Proceeds With ATC Privatization Despite CAA Concerns, WORLD AiRPORT
WK., Sept. 3, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8158853.
198 Id.
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cost-efficient way possible. '20 2 This method of contract procure-
ment abolishes old methods of the traditional contract-out re-
gime where government agencies relied on standardized
specifications or bureaucratic development of design specifica-
tions with the designers having little incentive to cut costs or
maximize service innovations. 3
In addition to reservations about planning, McLauchlan fears
the privatization scheme is too time-consuming, and says that if
NATS were allowed to borrow financing from private banks, as
the German system allows, the new Scottish ATC centers would
already be two-and-a-half years further along.2
°4
Despite concerns, this new shift in U.K. air space control
could prove to be an intermediary step in making NATS totally
independent. Under this new partial privatization system, air-
space policy and regulatory activities previously undertaken by
NATS have been transferred to a newly created body called the
Joint Air Navigation Services Council. This council will be made
up of representatives from NATS, Military Air Traffic Opera-
tions, and the Director of Airspace Policy.
2°5
F. UNITED STATES
In Washington, Republican leadership endorses full privatiza-
tion, whereas President Clinton, favoring corporatization, has
proposed turning the ATC into a government corporation. The
FAA has established three key principles that must be followed
in restructuring the ATC system toward a government-con-
trolled private corporation:
(1) The need to upgrade equipment and systems must be recog-
nized as urgent and be acted upon;
(2) The organization must have the ability to raise capital
through private markets and through the Treasury;
(3) The organization must have the ability to attract the highest
quality managers and staff.2 °6
Unfortunately, no privatization plan of any kind has left the
House Transportation Committee.
One concern has been that the governmental revenues gener-
ated by the sale of the ATC would not be enough to justify sell-
202 Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 99, at 375.
203 See id.
204 See Morrocco, supra note 196, at 32.
205 See id.
206 Charles & Newman, supra note 12, at 39.
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ing it.2117 There has also been concern that privatization could
be blamed for airline crashes in the future. 208 The expectation,
however, is that airline safety will improve with privatization.
The FAA will still have control of airline safety regulations, and a
private corporation should be able to increase efficiency and
thus upgrade the aging air traffic system. 2" This should de-
crease situations like the six-minute control tower power outage
at Pittsburgh International Airport on January 31, 1995, when
an air traffic controller had to use a pay phone to call other
airports and tell them to hold flights to Pittsburgh.2 11
Salaries should also benefit from privatization, thus enticing
the best personnel to our busiest airports. Currently, there are
uniform government salaries that make places with high living
costs such as Chicago and New York less desirable for air traffic
controllers. 2 11
Political pressures from the aviation community in general ap-
pear to be the primary reason privatization has been grounded
in the United States..2 " The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Associa-
tion is a strong lobby opposing privatization because private pi-
lots do not presently pay their full share for air traffic services. 21
In addition, the U.S. air traffic controllers union opposes
privatization.
Since 1985, over thirteen studies of FAA/ATC reorganization
have been completed. Although each of these past efforts was
met with opposition from certain aviation sectors, there is one
thing on which the entire aviation community agrees: change is
badly needed.2 1
4
VII. PLANS & PROPOSITIONS FOR CHANGE
A. THE REASON FOUNDATION PROPOSAL
The Reason Foundation, a Los Angeles-based advocate of
privatization, proposes a user controlled air traffic control sys-
tem that is predicated on a system of "user pay means user
say.''215 This plan, which calls for taking air traffic control
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outside government, and turning control and funding over to
aviation users, attempts to meet the needs of the users by replac-
ing old systems with state-of-the-art technology.216 Robert Poole,
President of the Reason Foundation, said that the user-con-
trolled system would "still be regulated for safety at arm's length
by a revamped FAA." '217
The user-fee approach would replace the ten percent federal
tax currently imposed on airline ticket prices to finance the
FAA. Poole emphasizes that "this is hardly a new idea .... [A] t
least 15 other countries already have ATC air traffic control user
fees in place. 21 8 Darrle Jenkins, director of the Aviation Foun-
dation, a Virginia research group, says that "[c]urrently, the
FAA believes that its clients are the air traffic controllers... [but
t]he reality is that the airlines and travelers are the clients. '219 It
is the airlines who are hurt by an inefficient ATC, because their
costs go up and in cities with congestion, low-cost carriers are
restricted. In addition, the consumers are hit hardest because
they bear the costs of congestion and regressive taxes through
ticket prices.220
Fort Worth-based American Airlines supports the imposition
of user fees because they will be fairer. 221 The fees will not in-
crease with the distance of a route, no matter how long.
222
Under the current system, flight distance can add $100 or more
to the price of a ticket.223
Big carriers such as American also contend that this will equal-
ize the costs between larger carriers and smaller ones. 224 Big
carriers contend that short-haul carriers take off and land more
often, using ATC more, so should be responsible for their share
of the costs from using the system.225
Short-haul carriers such as Dallas-based Southwest Airlines are
against user imposed fees because they claim the fee would
216 See id.
217 Id.
218 Michael D. Towle, Airline Ticket User Fee Sought Aviation and Public Policy
Groups Say Such a Fee Would More Equitably Finance the FAA Than the Current Federal









JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
make up a disproportionate amount of their ticket price.226
Smaller carriers do not favor the system because their fares are
low which means the taxes are low, usually about $6 per ticket,
but a user fee could more than double this figure.227 Southwest
spokesman Ed Stewart said it would not favor any fee that raises
the price of tickets because Southwest Airlines is committed to
offering its customers low fares.2 28 Chairman, President, and
CEO of Southwest Airlines, Herbert D. Kelleher, asserts that a
user-fee system is a scheme by the seven largest airlines to in-
crease short-haul carrier taxes while decreasing their taxes..2 29
Poole's response to Southwest Airlines' view is that the com-
pany should not jump to conclusions on the impact user fees
will have on their business. According to Poole, "[a] system
based upon both en route charges, that take into account dis-
tance, and terminal charges, that take into account airplane
weight and the number of terminal operations, would be fair
both to Southwest and to the large airlines.123  The use of
weight in the fee structure promotes the fairness of the system
because the lighter the aircraft, the lower the fee.231
B. FAA'S PLANs FOR CHANGE-CHALLENGE 2000
In 1995, the Challenge 2000 project was created in response
to the changing needs in the aviation industry. This re-examina-
tion of the FAA's safety and certification operation will serve to
aid in charting a course for the future of the aviation industry.2 2
A Virginia-based firm was hired to conduct the review and pro-
vide recommendations for positioning the agency's regulation
and certification efforts. Former FAA Administrator David R.
Hinson emphasized the FAA's need to respond to changes and
said "that's why last year I asked two independent sources to
take a top-to-bottom look at our safety regulation and certifica-
tion operation. '233 Hinson noted that any changes in the FAA's
certification and regulation organization will be done methodi-
226 See id.
227 See id.
228 See Towle, supra note 218, at 1.
229 See User Fees for FAA Services: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the
House Transp. and Infrastructure Comm., 107th Cong. (1997) (statement of Herbert
D. Kelleher, CEO, Southwest Airlines).
230 Towle, supra note 218, at 1.
231 SeeA Model ForA User Fee Funded ATC, Bus. & COMM. Av., Mar. 1, 1997, at 80.
232 See U.S. Dep't of Transp., FAA Releases Challenge 2000 Findings, May 16, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 263663.
233 Id.
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cally over the next three to six years.23 4 Some of the key recom-
mendations by Challenge 2000 are efforts the FAA has already
begun. Other recommendations by the committee are:
1. Identification of industry practices that promote a safe op-
erating environment with encouragement and implementation
of these procedures.
2. The regulation and certification organization, working with
the airline industry, would create centers of excellence which
would serve as repositories of expertise. These centers would be-
come the recognized authorities on specific subject areas, thus
increasing efficiency and consistency of information provided to
other FAA offices and to the industry.
3. The rule-making function of the FAA would be improved by
creating integrated rule-making teams. These teams would in-
clude all necessary FAA resources and would coordinate closely
with the Aviation Rule-Making Advisory Committee (ARAC).
ARAC is made up of sixty-four organizations representing all ar-
eas of the aviation community. This new rule-making technique
would focus attention on the outcome rather than the bureau-
cratic process of developing a rule.
4. The regulation and certification organization would be re-
structured to accommodate the new model-centers of
excellence.235
This effort by the FAA comes late, but it is concrete proof that
the FAA is attempting to meet the challenges of "rapidly chang-
ing technology, and unprecedented growth in air travel ... 236
This plan should assist the FAA in achieving its goal of zero acci-
dents in the future. Plan organization is set to be done methodi-
cally over a period of three to six years.23 7
C. FAA's STANDARD TERMINAL AUTOMATION REPLACEMENT
SYSTEM
The FAA awarded one of its largest contracts to Raytheon Co.
to build the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement Sys-
tem (STARS). STARS is a joint acquisition between the FAA
and the Department of Defense (DOD) that will provide new
computers, displays, and software for up to 172 approach con-
234 See id.
235 Id.
236 FAA Releases Challenge 2000 Findings, supra note 232, at 1.
237 See id.
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trol facilities and towers.238 STARS is the FAA's first large pro-
gram acquisition in which the FAA minimizes costs by taking
advantage of commercially available hardware and software.2 9
Transportation Secretary Pefia has stated that "[w]ith the
STARS contract award, the administration is delivering on the
commitment we made to Congress to put air traffic control
modernization back on track. 240
STARS is a huge step in the right direction for modernizing
the FAA and the air traffic control system. In addition to stan-
dardizing air traffic control equipment at 172 FAA facilities,
STARS will also standardize 199 Department of Defense facili-
ties.2 1 The new system will result in the 1.5 million people who
fly every day continuing to benefit from the safest aviation sys-
tem in the world, fewer delays for these travelers, and safer,
more reliable automated control facilities. Furthermore, the
STARS system is equipped to handle expected growth into the
twenty-first century. It is estimated that in the next decade,
nearly 800 million more people will be flying each year-nearly
forty percent more than today.242 This new system is set up to
accommodate this growth. 43
Between September 1994 and October 1996, there were
thirty-one breakdowns of air traffic control systems at major air-
ports. 244 The most frequent breakdowns have occurred at some
of the busiest airports such as Chicago and New York-airports
that have the oldest computers. 245 These cities will receive new
system implementation first. STARS is expected to provide the
much needed improvements in the ATC system, including "im-
proved surface separation, improved weather displays, color dis-
plays of flights, better data link communications, improved
conflict alert warnings, better traffic management capabilities,
238 See FAA Selects Raytheon For Next-Generation Air Traffic Control System Upgrade,
in FEDERAL DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY DOCUMENTS, Sept. 16, 1996.
239 See STARS Managers, Raytheon Answer Software Questions, Av. DAILY, Jan. 10,
1997, available in 1997 WL 8611231.
240 Raytheon Wins, UNION LEADER, Sept. 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, FDCH Li-
brary, Federal Department and Agency Documents.
241 See id.
242 See Federal Aviation Administration Holds a News Conference to Announce $1 Bil-
lion Air Traffic Modernization Contract, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 16, 1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter News Conference].
243 See id.
244 See ATC Radar Problems To End With FAA Computer Installations, WORLD AIR-
PORT WK., Nov. 19, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8158942.
245 See id.
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and supplemental flight data processing for the controllers. 246
STARS should be operational in Boston in 1998, and will be in-
stalled subsequently in other FAA and Department of Defense
facilities through the year 2007.247
Although the outlook for the STARS program looks promis-
ing, problems have already arisen between the FAA and Ray-
theon. Teams from the FAA and Raytheon have spent a
significant amount of time addressing differences of interpreta-
tion pertaining to software specifications for the program.248
David Ford, manager of the program for the FAA, said that out
of the 80,000 lines of code being developed for the STARS pro-
gram, the issue in controversy pertained to 24,000 lines of code
affecting 25 functions.249 Despite these disagreements, Execu-
tive Vice President and General Manager of Raytheon Elec-
tronic Systems, William H. Swanson, insists that Raytheon "is
fully committed to meeting or beating the STARS contract
schedule requirement, including completion of the initial sys-
tem operation at the Boston STARS site. 250
In addition to software disagreements, the STARS program
has also been hit with an expected cost increase that could be as
high as $529 million. The General Accounting Office has pre-
dicted that the life-cycle cost baseline for STARS could increase
from the $2.23 billion level approved in January 1997 to as
much as $2.76 billion.251 According to the GAO, the cost in-
crease stems from higher costs for operating and maintaining
STARS equipment. 252 FAA officials acknowledge that there may
be cost growth but insist that they do not expect an actual cost
increase will be as high as $529 million.253 Because of comple-
tion date delays caused by disagreements and cost increases,
FAA officials overseeing the implementation of the STARS pro-
246, ld.
247 See News Conference, supra note 242, at 1.
248 See FAA, Raytheon Resolve STARS Differences, AEROSPACE DAILY, Jan. 10, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 8606241.
249 See id.
250 Raytheon Completes STARS Milestones, CNS OUTLOOK, Feb. 5, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 8586243.
251 See STARS Could Increase By $529 Million, GAO Says, Av. DAILY, Mar. 10, 1997,
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gram have informed Raytheon that they intend to elevate
STARS to a "high risk status." '254
The STARS program appears to be a step in the right direc-
tion for Air Traffic Control, but its effectiveness and efficiency
remain to be seen. So far, the FAA needs improved coordina-
tion within the agency for STARS to be completed on sched-
ule.255 The GAO has concluded that in order for Raytheon to
be able to deliver STARS on time, the FAA must mitigate risks
from potential scheduling conflicts, from potential difficulties
developing software, and from a lack of commitment from those
with vested interests.256 Without these changes, this moderniza-
tion project, like many of the FAA's other modernization
projects, will most likely run over budget and miss implementa-
tion deadlines.
D. FAA's NEW PROCUREMENT SYSTEM
Although no real privatization schemes have been put into
action in the United States for ATC, the FAA has made attempts
to combat some of the problems that privatization would solve.
On April 1, 1996, the FAA put into effect a new procurement
system, pursuant to the Fiscal Year 1996 Transportation Appro-
priations Act,257 which exempts the FAA from many of the fun-
damental acquisition laws and regulations. 258  This system
should aid modernization plans by expediting the process of ob-
taining contracts with private sector companies.
The FAA's procurement reform is an ambitious effort to
change the current process of handling bid protests and con-
tract disputes which often plague the procurement process.259
Section 348 of the DOT Appropriations Act created the new
procurement system that essentially creates an independent pro-
curement process for the FAA.26 ° The system change was
spurred by the privatization movement, which, by itself, has yet
to be accepted as a solution to ATC problems. Although refus-
254 FAA Officials Recommend High-Risk Status For STARS Development, Av. DAILY,
May 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8614849.
255 See Bruce D. Nordwall, Despite GAO Skeptism, FAA Says STARS On Track, Av.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8280171.
256 See id.
257 See Rand L. Allen & Christopher R. Yukins, Bid Protests and Contract Disputes
Under The FAA's New Procurement System, 26 PuB. CONT. L.J. 135, 135 (1997).
258 See White et al., supra note 1, at B10.
259 See Allen & Yukins, supra note 257, at 135.
2h ) See id.
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ing to turn to privatization as an answer for ATC procurement
delays, Congress agreed that something needed to be done to
increase efficiency. Toward that goal, Congress passed a radical
procurement reform for the FAA.
The goal of the new system is to run the FAA more like a
private organization through implementing a new personnel sys-
tem, reducing lengthy procurement rules, and buying commer-
cially-available products. 261 Improved employee training and
the creation of procurement teams who focus on efficient
purchasing techniques are part of the FAA's latest attempt to
free itself from the weights of government control. Former FAA
administrator David R. Hinson firmly believes that the FAA's
new system will be able to cut in half the amount of time it takes
to get new equipment.26 2 Hinson points to the award of the
STARS contract as an example of an efficient contract award
under the new system because it took only six months to award
the contract to Raytheon. Under the old system, it may have
taken up to eighteen months.263
A key element of the FAA's procurement reform sets out new
specific internal procedures for processing bid protests and con-
tract disputes. Under the new system, the FAA's Office of Dis-
pute Resolution (ODR) hears both the bid protests and contract
disputes. The ODR's decision is only reviewable by the FAA Ad-
ministrator. Judicial review of FAA decisions is limited to the
United States courts of appeals.264
In an attempt to reduce litigation, the new procedure works
in the following manner. Protests by contractors are first sub-
mitted to the Contracting Officer, who acts under the advice of
the FAA legal department and who has full discretion to settle
the dispute provided it does not involve fraud.265
If the parties fail to reach a settlement agreement, they are con-
fronted by a maze of procedural options. The protest or dispute
will go to the Office of Dispute Resolution, where the FAA dis-
pute resolution officer will attempt to encourage informal alter-
native dispute resolutions. If that fails, the parties may opt for
binding arbitration. The decision in binding arbitration will
261 See Stephen Barr, Reinventing Gets A Test Flight at FAA: Attempt to Run Agency
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then be subject to review by the FAA Administrator, who may
indicate "nonconcurrence" with the arbitrator's decision.2 6
In the event the parties do not choose binding arbitration, a
dispute resolution officer will hear the dispute and give his rec-
ommendation to the FAA administrator who will make a final
decision in the matter.2 67
Although the goal of this procurement scheme is to increase
efficiency within the FAA, thereby effectuating aviation improve-
ments, it is questionable whether the FAA's new dispute system
will be successful. One reason for concern stems from the idea
that the new dispute system "will not decrease the time it takes the
FAA to procure new equipment.''26 ' Because claims are generally
heard years after a procurement is completed, changing the
claims process will not shorten the amount of time it takes the
FAA to procure new air traffic control systems.2 6 9 In fact, it is
possible that the new procurement process will actually slow pro-
curement procedures since contractors may want to negotiate
every detail of a deal for fear of not being able to recover unan-
ticipated costs later.27 Similarly, FAA procurement costs may go
up if contractors fear being unable to recover additional costs
through a subjective, internal claims process controlled by the
FAA administrator.27 1
There is also concern that the new procedures eliminate im-
portant procedural safeguards from the traditional dispute sys-
tem. 72  Critics fear that the revamped FAA system could
undermine the goals of open competition, fairness, and uni-
formity that guide federal bureaucracies. 73
Despite the criticism, the FAA's new procurement plan is a
plausible attempt to address the need for quicker procurement
procedures. Its implementation, however, could prove to be an-
other inefficient governmental attempt to facilitate moderniza-
tion. The actual effectiveness of this legislation remains to be
seen.
'6 Id. at 146-47.
27 See id. at 147.
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E. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION To AID FAA FUNDING NEEDS
The FAA's most recent attempt to rectify its funding problems
through Congress finally gained approval. On October 9, 1996,
President Clinton signed the Federal Aviation Reauthorization
Act of 1996,274 which provides critical funding for the construc-
tion, safety, and security upgrades needed by U.S. air navigation
systems. Prompted by the 1996 tragedies of the Valujet crash
and TWA Flight 800 disaster, political awareness of the urgency
for change finally came to the forefront of discussion. Increas-
ing numbers of passengers traveling through the skies high-
lighted the pressures placed on airport capacities and their air
traffic control systems. The House, which first passed the legis-
lation, appeared to be committed to aviation legislation by the
overwhelming passage of this bill and recent previous pieces of
legislation pertaining to making the FAA an independent
agency and reforming the costly procurement and personnel
procedures.275
The much needed FAA Reauthorization Act authorizes fund-
ing for improvements such as new air traffic control equipment,
more FAA inspectors, and also funds aviation security improve-
ments such as new bomb detection systems. The new Act shifts
the focus of the FAA's primary purpose from air commerce reg-
ulation to air safety and security. 2 7 6
Although the Act is a positive change for FAA funding, the
length of time it took to actually implement the change is a pri-
mary example of problems with Congressional decision making.
Critical decisions that need to be made in a timely fashion and
quickly implemented get stalled in Congress. During Senate de-
bate, a plan to allocate $19 billion to FAA programs over the
next two years was stalled when senators objected to a single
provision.277
The one area in dispute in an otherwise noncontroversial bill
centered around language some said would make it more diffi-
cult for Federal Express workers to unionize by placing them
under the Railway Labor Act, which requires them to organize
274 See Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110
Stat. 3213 (1996) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
275 See House Approves FAA Funding and Aviation Safety, Security Package, Sept. 27,
1996, available in 1996 WL 11125442.
276 See Diane Westwood Wilson, The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996,
11 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1 (1997).
277 SeeJim Abrams, House Approves Funding for FAA; Bill Held Up in Senate, Asso-
CIATED PRESS, Sept. 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4442053 (emphasis added).
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nationally.278 The fact that the express carriers were not under
the Act until now is being blamed on a previous technical error
in the 1995 ICC Termination Act. Thus, this Reauthorization
Act corrects the error by placing carriers under the Railway La-
bor Act.279 The result is that Federal Express employees fall
under the same labor laws as do the airlines. The Senate re-
fused to pass the House version but did finally approve its own
version of the bill.
The Reauthorization Act recognizes the FAA's unique situa-
tion in that it functions twenty-four hours a day and badly needs
a more efficient organizational structure to move into the
twenty-first century.280 The goal of the Act is to create a more
autonomous and accountable FAA within the DOT.28 ' The re-
form section of the Act requires that the FAA establish an air
traffic control modernization review and mandates the termina-
tion of projects that fall short of performance goals or fail to
meet budgets. 28 2
F. SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE RECOMMENDATION
Despite the recent legislative initiatives to facilitate ATC mod-
ernization, more internal organization is needed within the
FAA. GAO Official John Anderson has suggested that what the
FAA needs is a well-defined management system called a "Sys-
tems Architecture. '283 This scheme should serve as a detailed
blueprint of the FAA modernization goals and the methods to
be used to achieve those goals.2 4 The FAA badly needs this
technical architecture because currently the FAA's moderniza-
tion program consists of hundreds of segmented yet interrelated
systems that each have their individual goals and methodolo-
gies.285 The FAA needs to unify these missions with a systems
architecture to ensure that each plan operates effectively and
efficiently. The focus of this architecture must be setting out
the details of specific technological information so that it can be
278 See id.
279 SeeJohn Boehner, Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act, Sept. 25, 1996, avail-
able in 1996 WL 11125370.
280 See Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110
Stat. 3213 (1996) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
281 See id.
282 See Wilson, supra note 276, at 9.
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uniformly used to build modernized system hardware, software,
and data management centers. 286
The most expensive and complex component of ATC mod-
ernization is new software development for new computer sys-
tems.28 7 Often, it is the actual process of developing and
maintaining the software that determines its effectiveness and
efficiency. 288 Preliminary studies of the FAA's current software
development and acquisition system show that the process is at
great risk of not delivering timely software programs suitable for
their intended use within budget.289 This prediction stems from
the fact that although the FAA is attempting new procurement
procedures, it does not have an organized, effective manage-
ment approach to coordinate its modernization efforts.29 °
Two examples of the need for software development coordi-
nation are STARS and the Wide Area Augmentation System
(WAAS). Both plans called for extensive software development
and neither program is scheduled for completion until after the
year 2000. Although recent legislative reform did accelerate the
speed with which these two major contracts were awarded, the
FAA has continued to struggle with the technical and manage-
rial aspects of both plans.29'
Furthermore, the FAA modernization effort needs financial
coordination as well. In an independent financial assessment of
the FAA, Coopers & Lybrand concluded that the FAA must
learn to manage money. The firm strongly suggested that the
FAA develop a detailed accounting system with financial man-
agement tools and personnel incentives.292 The need for coor-
dination and consolidation is clear; if Congress will not
privatize, then it should at least recognize the need for a de-
tailed system of architecture to provide the FAA with specific
guidance on the implementation of its modernization agendas.
286 See id. at 491-92.
287 See id. at 493.
288 See id. at 493-94.
289 See id. at 494.
290 See id. at 494-95.
291 See id. at 495.
292 See Financial Assessment of the FAA: Hearings Before the House Aviation Sub-
comm. of the Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 105th Cong. (1997), available in
1997 WL 11233169 (statement of Edward A. Merlis, Senior Vice President, Gov-
ernment Affairs Air Transport Assoc. of America).
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This extensive internal organization plan is also supported by
NATCA. According to Eastern Region Vice President of the Air
Traffic Controllers Association, Joe Fruscella,
[a]ir traffic controllers and their current work environment de-
serve careful study to accurately determine future requirements
in both technology and ergonomics. To simply develop technol-
ogy and abandon present ground-based navigation and surveil-
lance systems could create resistance and ultimately result in
failure of any modernization efforts. Therefore, it is absolutely
necessary to establish a central organization to coordinate both
the developing technology and attendant human factors
issues. 93
NATCA's concern centers around the FAA's lack of coordina-
tion in new system development and human concerns. Often,
controllers are brought in too late in the development to assist
in new technological system implementation. By not including
air traffic controllers in the initial technological development of
new programs, often the plans work in theory but run into
problems when the systems are actually set up. This problem is
another example of the need for an internal organizational
scheme within the FAA.
VIII. CONCLUSION
With its outdated equipment and overworked controllers, the
United States air traffic control system is a disaster waiting to
happen. The reason the nation has let the ATC digress to this
point is simple: the FAA and in particular, the ATC, is not ac-
countable to its users.29 4 The government has no obligation
whatsoever to incorporate the views of those who use the air traf-
fic control system. Thus, the government is not accountable for
the consequences of its decisions.
Privatization (or a form of privatization) offers a solution to
the problem of accountability. It offers a method to maintain
and improve the safest ATC system in the world while dramati-
cally revamping and modernizing equipment, thus increasing
the efficiency of aircraft control. Although monitoring air safety
is inherently a governmental function, air traffic control is not.
"The federal government deems a function to be 'inherently
governmental' if the public interest mandates the performance
291 See Fruscella Testimony, supra note 37.
294 See Ed Perkins, No Quick Fix Making Skies Safer-And More Efficient, 0-u.
TRIB., Aug. 4, 1996, at C2.
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of that function by government employees, such as a func-
tion.'"295 These inherently governmental functions usually refer
to decision-making functions that require government authority
or rendering of value judgements. "In contrast, commercial ac-
tivities eligible for contracting out include... management sup-
port services [and] security and civil and military
transportation.'296 Thus, air traffic control is not an inherent gov-
ernmental function.
Air control is performed for a variety of users-airlines, pri-
vate pilots, and military aviation. The ATC should be organized
to be accountable to those users and to the flying public, those
with a stake in the consequences of air traffic decisions.297
Changing funding from a ticket tax to user fees, like the system
proving to be successful in Canada, would create a system of ac-
countability for the U.S. aviation industry, free up funding from
binding Congressional ties, and aid in the reduction of the
deficit.
In addition, privatization plans offer an end to the fear of an
air disaster caused by aging navigation equipment. Allowing the
private sector to have direct control eliminates the hassles and
delays associated with lengthy government procurement proce-
dures and Congressional politics. In addition, private control
would allow for safer and much more efficient technological
methods of navigation to be implemented throughout the na-
tion's increasingly busy airports. With safety regulation remain-
ing a government function, but the many other responsibilities
of the ATC shifting to private control, the United States naviga-
tional system would become accountable to its users, safer
through technological advancements, and significantly more
efficient.
295 White et al., supra note 1, at B1O.
296 Id. (emphasis added).
297 See Towle, supra note 218, at Al.
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